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State v. Bassett: Washington Courts Can No

Longer Sentence Juveniles to Die in Prison
Carrie Mount

INTRODUCTION
In State v. Bassett, the Washington Supreme Court held that the practice
of sentencing juveniles to life in prison without the possibility of parole
violates Washington State’s constitution because it constitutes cruel
punishment.1 Washington’s article I, section 14, differs from the Eighth
Amendment by banning “cruel” punishment, as opposed to the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment. 2 The Bassett
court’s holding applied to the only juvenile group that was still subject to
life without parole (LWOP) sentences—juvenile offenders who committed
aggravated first-degree murder when they were sixteen or seventeen years
old. A week earlier, the Washington Supreme Court had decided State v.
Gregory,3 unanimously holding that sentencing any defendant to the death
penalty violates the same provision of Washington’s constitution.4 In
Gregory, every justice signed onto the majority’s opinion. Conversely, the
Bassett court was closely split in a 5-4 decision.
This Article will argue that Bassett’s split results largely from the
majority and the dissent’s disagreement about which test to use when
deciding challenges to juvenile sentencing: the Fain “proportionality test,”5
or the federally employed “categorical bar” test. The Bassett majority
deviated from its own framework, the Fain proportionality test, which
evaluates (1) the nature of the offense; (2) the legislative purpose behind the
1
2
3
4
5

State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2018). [hereinafter Bassett II].
Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 with U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621 (Wash. 2018).
WASH. CONST. art. I, §14.
State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720 (Wash. 1980).
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statute; (3) the punishment the defendant would have received in other
jurisdictions; and (4) the punishment meted out for other offenses in the
same jurisdiction.6 Instead, the Bassett court applied the categorical bar test,
which was largely used by the United States Supreme Court when deciding
the constitutionality of juvenile punishment laws. 7 The categorical bar test
considers (1) whether there is objective indicia of a national consensus
against the sentencing practice at issue, and (2) the court’s own independent
judgment based on “‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and
by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the [cruel
punishment provision’s] text, history . . . and purpose.’” 8 The Fain test
considers whether a particular sentence is fair and proportionate as applied
to an individual offender, while the categorical bar test assesses a class of
offenders as a whole and determines whether a particular punishment can
ever be constitutional as applied to the class.9
Part I of this Article will describe Bassett’s posture and the court’s
holding that article I, section 14 is more protective than its federal
counterpart and prohibits juvenile LWOP sentences. Part II will discuss the
United States Supreme Court’s recent holdings announcing that juvenile
offenders are less culpable than adults and thus less deserving of
punishment. Part III offers potential explanations for the Bassett court’s
departure from its traditional test and discuss the disagreement between the
majority and dissent. The Article concludes by highlighting Bassett’s
impact on trial judges who are tasked with the important role of sentencing
juvenile offenders.

6

Id. at 726.
See Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787 (2016).
8
The second prong, the exercise of independent judgment, “requires consideration of
the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along
with the severity of the punishment in question. In this inquiry the Court also considers
whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.” Bassett,
428 at 351 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
9
Bassett II, 428 at 346.
7
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I. THE BASSETT DECISION
Facts and Procedural Posture
Brian Bassett was sixteen when he killed his mother, father, and younger
brother in their home. At the time, Bassett was homeless because he had
been kicked out by his parents, who had recently denied his request to move
back in with his family.10 Another juvenile, McDonald, assisted Bassett in
the crime and had originally confessed to the murder of Bassett’s brother;
later, McDonald claimed that Bassett was solely responsible for his
brother’s death.11 After a jury convicted Bassett of three counts of
aggravated murder, the trial judge sentenced him to three consecutive terms
of life in prison, without the possibility of parole. At his sentencing hearing,
the judge commented that Bassett was “a walking advertisement” for the
death penalty.12 In 1996, the sentence Bassett received was mandatory
under state law.13 However, the practice of sentencing juveniles pursuant to
a mandatory scheme has since been overturned in Washington.14
Washington enacted its “Miller-fix” statute in response to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama.15 Miller held that
when sentencing juveniles convicted of homicide to LWOP, the sentencing
court must consider several youth-based mitigating factors in its decision
and that a failure to consider these factors violates the Eighth Amendment
and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.16 With the hopes of parole
eligibility, Bassett, at thirty-five years old, sought resentencing pursuant to

10

Id. at 351.
State v. Bassett, 394 P.3d 430, 433 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) [hereinafter Bassett I]; See
State v. McDonald, 953 P.2d 470 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
12
Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 346 (summarizing trial court judgment and sentence).
13
Id.
14
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2018) invalidated by Bassett, 428 at 343.
15
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
16
Id. at 480 (holding the sentencing body must “take into account how children are
different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a
lifetime in prison”).
11
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Washington’s Miller-fix statute, codified at Revised Code of Washington
(RCW) 10.95.030.17 The Miller-fix statute required the court to consider
youth-based mitigating factors “including, but not limited to, the age of the
individual, the youth’s childhood and life experience, the degree of
responsibility the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s chances
of becoming rehabilitated.”18 The judge heard testimony of experts who
described Bassett as a teenager.19 A pediatric psychologist who had worked
with Bassett before the murders testified to Bassett’s low executive
functioning skills at the time of the crime, including his inability to
comprehend the consequences of his actions, his adjustment disorder
diagnosis prior to the crime leading to maladaptive stress responses, and the
immense trauma he felt while living on the streets after his parents banned
him from their home.20 Psychologists discussed his new ability to
comprehend the gravity and reprehensive nature of his crimes by
participating in family-systems therapy—and by simply maturing.21 The
State offered no evidence to refute Bassett’s youth-based mitigating
evidence, which Bassett argued demonstrated his diminished culpability. 22
Even when faced with Bassett’s uncontroverted evidence and arguments,
the judge upheld the original sentence: three consecutive life terms. 23
Bassett appealed his resentencing to the Washington State Court of
Appeals. One of his arguments was a facial challenge to the state’s enacted
17

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(3)(b) (2018) invalidated by Bassett, 428 at 343.
Id.
19
Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 346–48.
20
Id.
21
Bassett also presented evidence of rehabilitation including having earned a GED,
making the honor roll, being a mentor at the community college, and having participated
in extensive family therapy. The judge concluded that Bassett’s actions were less
demonstrative of rehabilitation and more evidence that he was “doing things in prison to
make his time more tolerable.” Id. at 343. The Washington Supreme Court has held that
rehabilitation evidence is irrelevant to a Miller resentencing and becomes pertinent only
if an inmate is considered for parole. State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 665 (Wash. 2017).
22
Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 347.
23
Id.
18
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Miller-fix statute.24 Specifically, Bassett argued that the statute’s allowance
for the possibility of juvenile LWOP amounted to cruel punishment. 25 The
court of appeals agreed with Bassett’s facial challenge and held that the
statute violated Article I, section 14.26 In its reasoning, the court used a
categorical bar analysis instead of its well-established test for challenges
under the cruel punishment provision—the Fain test.27 The United States
Supreme Court had used a categorical bar analysis when considering
challenges to juvenile sentencing laws by shelving so-called proportionality
tests, and Iowa’s highest court had also moved to a categorical bar test
when interpreting state law juvenile punishment challenges in State v.
Sweet.28 The Bassett Court of Appeals opinion discussed Sweet at length,
approving of its explicit adoption of the United States Supreme Court’s
categorical bar test.29 The Sweet court cited United States Supreme Court
cases as persuasive authority despite deciding the case solely on state
constitutional grounds.30 After Bassett’s victory in the court of appeals, the
State petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review. 31 The State
argued that the court of appeals should have applied the Fain
proportionality test to evaluate sentences challenged under Article I, Section
14, not the categorical bar test. The court, in a 5-4 decision, ultimately
disagreed.32

24

Bassett, 394 P.3d at 432.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 437.
28
State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016).
29
Bassett, 394 P.3d at 438.
30
The Sweet court held that its use of the United States Supreme Court’s juvenile cases,
its principles, reasoning, and its employment of the categorical bar analysis was
permissible because federal decisions are “persuasive, but . . . certainly not binding”
authority on matters of state criminal law that satisfy the federal constitutional floor.
Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 832.
31
Brief for Petitioner at 20, State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 2017 (Wash. 2017) (No.
94556-0).
32
Id.
25
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Perhaps the court was anticipating a facial challenge. In 2017, the
Washington Supreme Court reviewed the resentencing of Joel Ramos
pursuant to the Miller-fix statute, and held that his resentencing hearing met
minimal federal constitutional guidelines, but that it would not consider
independent Washington constitutional grounds because the parties failed to
brief the Gunwall factors.33 The Gunwall factors, which are described in
detail below, guide Washington courts’ analyses of whether a state
constitutional provision is more protective than its federal counterpart. 34 If,
after a properly briefed Gunwall analysis, the court concludes that a state
constitutional provision is more protective than its federal analogue, the
court can examine the constitutionality of a challenged statute exclusively
under the state constitution.35 While unable to address a facial challenge in
the absence of a Gunwall analysis, the Ramos court, in a unanimous
decision, acknowledged Iowa’s Sweet holding and that it did “not foreclose
the possibility that this court may reach a similar conclusion in a future
case, but the briefing here does not adequately explain why we must do so
as a matter of Washington constitutional law.”36
Washington’s Ban on Cruel Punishment
Washington’s Article I, section 14, unlike the Eighth Amendment, bans
cruel punishment without the federally required showing that it is also
“unusual.”37 In Michigan v. Long, the United States Supreme Court held
that state supreme courts must take care to ground their decisions in state
constitutional law or face review by the United States Supreme Court. 38 The
United States Supreme Court assumes that a state’s constitutional holding is
33

State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 665 (Wash. 2017).
Id. at 667. The Gunwall factors originated in State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811
(Wash. 1986).
35
Bassett, 428 P.3d at 350.
36
Ramos, 387 P.3d at 668.
37
Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 with U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
38
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
34
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based on the United States Constitution unless the state court expressly
announces its reasoning is state law based.39 The Long Court further
provided that a state court must explain when it uses federal case law as
non-binding authority in order to overcome the presumption that the issue
was based on federal constitutional precedent and, therefore, subject to
United States Supreme Court review.40
The Bassett court unambiguously decided the case under article I, section
14.41 In reaching its holding, the Bassett court also followed Miller and its
progeny by using neurological evidence as applied to an entire category —
youthful offenders—and by employing the categorical bar test.42 The Long
Court did not foreclose this approach; in fact, it held that state court
decisions that are grounded in state constitutional law would not be subject
to federal review even when they rely on federal courts’ analyses to reach
their holdings.43 As such, the Bassett court followed a line of United States
Supreme Court juvenile punishment cases, adopting much of their
reasoning, including the categorical bar approach. In adopting the United
States Supreme Court’s categorical bar test, the Bassett court rejected
Washington’s Fain proportionality test—much to the dissent’s outrage.44
39

Id. at 1040–41 (“Accordingly, when . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when [the] state
law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so . . . . If the state court decision indicates
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.”)
(emphasis added).
40
Id.
41
Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 349, 350.
42
Id. at 355 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
43
Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (“If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents
as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a
plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for
the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has
reached.”).
44
See infra Part II for a discussion of the majority’s choice to use the categorical bar, not
the Fain test.
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Long was satisfied because the majority rooted its holding in Washington’s
constitution and stated that federal jurisprudence was persuasive but not
dispositive.45Although the Bassett court protected itself from United States
Supreme Court review, the majority imported federal case law and analysis
to reach its ultimate holding. As discussed below, such an approach created
a 5-4 split in the court’s opinion.
In Bassett, the court stated that a Gunwall46 analysis of article I, section
14 had almost always resulted in holding that the state provision provided
greater protection than the Eighth Amendment.47 Most of the Washington
Supreme Court’s cruel punishment cases that conducted a Gunwall analysis
found increased protection.48 A handful had held the opposite,
demonstrating, according to the Bassett court, that a Gunwall analysis was
necessary to resolve its “inconsistent precedent.” The court also stated that
the Gunwall analysis is dependent upon the challenged law and the specific
facts of each case.49 In other words, one Gunwall outcome does not
foreclose the determination of a provision’s protectiveness.50
The Gunwall Analysis
The Washington Supreme Court uses the non-exclusive Gunwall factors
to guide the court and litigants when briefing state constitutional issues.
Although the court’s composition and policy preferences may change, in
practice, the test remains in place to ensure some predictability as the make-

45

Long, 463 U.S. at 3476.
Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811.
47
Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 347.
48
Id. at 349 (collecting cases where the Washington Supreme Court found increased
protections under article I, section 14, including State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713 (Wash.
2000) and State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1996)).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 349 (“[E]ven where it is already established that the Washington Constitution
may provide enhanced protections on a general topic, parties are still required to explain
why enhanced protections are appropriate in specific applications.”) (quoting Ramos, 387
P.3d at 667).
46
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up of the bench shifts.51 Additionally, when judges are increasingly accused
of and susceptible to judicial activism, the factors assist in deciding difficult
constitutional policy issues more neutrally, or at least more predictably. 52
The factors used in a Gunwall analysis are (1) the state provision’s
language; (2) differences between the textual provisions; (3) state
constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences;
and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.
The Bassett court analyzed article I, section 14 in the specific context of
juveniles and LWOP sentences, discussing that the first three Gunwall
factors pointed to increased protection, partly because Washington’s
framers chose to omit “and unusual” from the State’s provision against
cruel punishment.53 As to the fourth factor, a discussion of existing state
law, the court dismissed the State’s arguments; the State asserted that
because Washington’s constitution is silent on juveniles, and that
Washington had once executed children, that greater protection should not
be afforded.54 Instead, the court held the evolution of the legislature’s and
court’s treatment of juveniles since statehood evidences a clear trend to treat
children in criminal justice differently.55
Agreeing with Bassett that the fourth factor, preexisting state law,
provided increased protection, the court named several cases demonstrating
that Washington courts had previously applied United States Supreme Court
reasoning for the principle that youths must be treated differently in
criminal punishment contexts.56 For example, in O’Dell, the Washington
Supreme Court cited neurological and brain studies used in the United

51

See Hugh D. Spitzer, Which Constitution? Eleven Years of Gunwall in Washington
State, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1187, 1205 (1998).
52
Id.
53
Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 349.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. (“This court has consistently applied the Miller principle that ‘children are
different’”); See State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 697, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).
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States Supreme Court’s opinions on juvenile culpability, including Roper v.
Simmons57 and Graham v. Florida.58 Roper held that the death penalty was
cruel and unusual punishment as applied to juveniles. Graham held that
sentencing non-homicide offenders to LWOP also constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment.59 To further support
the proposition that Washington has provided more protections for youth at
sentencing, the Bassett court discussed the recent legislative abandonment
of mandatory minimums for youth tried as adults, the expansion of parole
eligibility, and eliminating LWOP for children under fifteen years old. 60
The fifth factor always points toward higher protection because of the
inherent structural difference in the United States and state constitutions:
while the federal constitution is a grant of limited power to the federal
government by the people, Washington’s state constitution is a limitation on
the plenary power of the State.61 According to the Bassett court, the sixth
factor weighed in favor of local concern because, among other things, the
state’s laws already had trended toward “granting juveniles special
sentencing protections when appropriate.”62 Washington State was the first
to categorically enact juvenile sentencing reform, and while that effort has
moved in both more and less and punitive directions over the past five

57

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
59
Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 349.
60
Id. at 350; see also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.540(3); 10.95.030(3)(a)(i).
61
Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 815 (Wash. 1986) (“As this court has often observed, the United
States Constitution is a grant of limited power authorizing the federal government to
exercise only those constitutionally enumerated powers expressly delegated to it by the
states, whereas our state constitution imposes limitations on the otherwise plenary power
of the state to do anything not expressly forbidden by the state constitution or federal
law.”) (emphasis in original).
62
Bassett, 428 P.3d at 350.
58
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decades,63 scholars recognize the trend is away from harsher sentences for
youth in Washington.64
Having decided that the Gunwall analysis resulted in a more protective
state provision, what remained was for the Bassett court to apply a state
constitutional test: Washington’s familiar Fain proportionality test or the
federally derived categorical bar analysis. And therein lies much of the
disagreement between the dissent and the majority. In order to understand
the dispute amongst the justices and to evaluate the majority’s choice to
adopt federal reasoning and the categorical bar test, a brief discussion of
recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence with respect to juvenile
sentencing and punishment is warranted.

II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUVENILE SENTENCING
DECISIONS
A Shift to Brain Science, Increased Protection, and the Categorical Bar
Approach
Before Miller, the Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons65 in 2005,
holding that juvenile death sentences for crimes committed before an
offender is eighteen years old violates the Eighth Amendment. 66 The Roper
decision cemented the Court’s treatment of children as inherently different
63

For a history of juvenile justice reform in Washington through the 1990s and
arguments for increased reform, see Jeffery K. Day, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A
Punitive System in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 399 (1992).
64
See generally David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other
Washington, 28 CRIME & JUST. 71, 131 (2001) (concluding that Washington residents’
public opinion shapes what is acceptable in the state’s sentencing practices: “Law has
come to sentencing in Washington, and law evolves by public, not private decision
making. Law’s inevitable partner, politics, is a part of that process and inevitably means
that there will be winners and losers, step by step, issue by issue.”).
65
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 at 569–70 (discussing three main areas of difference between
adults and youths: (1) that as compared to adults, juveniles are more likely to exhibit
reckless behavior; (2) that youths are more susceptible to negative influences; and (3) that
youths’ character is well-formed—science and experience demonstrate that their choices
will improve as they mature into adults).
66
Id. at 561.
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based on society’s evolving standards of decency that recognize youths
have diminished culpability as a result of immaturity and transient
characteristics.67
The United States Supreme Court had also moved away from a case-bycase analysis and increasingly employed the categorical bar analysis.68
Although Roper’s holding was reasoned with a proportionality analysis, the
Graham court explained that the rule flowing from the case was a
categorical bar, because a rule allowing proportional analysis created the
risk that courts would not sufficiently consider youth’s diminished
culpability.69 The Roper court cited heavily to psychological and
neurological studies supporting Roper’s contention that youth cannot be
punished consonantly with adults because their character is not fixed, and
they possess a great capacity for change.70
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court categorically
barred juvenile sentences of LWOP for non-homicide crimes.71 The Court
reiterated Roper’s assessment of the inherent differences in juveniles and
further focused on the biological differences in the changing adolescent
brain.72 The Graham court reasoned that when an entire class of persons is
considered—in that case, youth who have committed non-homicide
offenses—a proportionality analysis is not useful.73 The Graham court
announced that a proportionality test that “[compares] the severity of the
penalty and the gravity of the crime does not advance the analysis. Here, in
addressing the question presented, the appropriate analysis is the one used
67

Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (2010) (discussing that Roper established the principle that
children are less deserving of punishment).
68
Id. at 95.
69
See John R. Mills et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and Practice:
Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535 (2016).
70
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing amici referencing scientific brain studies).
71
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
72
Id. at 68 (“[N]o recent data provide[s] reason to reconsider the Court’s observations
in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”).
73
Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62.
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in cases that involved the categorical approach.”74 The Graham court’s
reasoning that juvenile LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses
constituted cruel and unusual punishment utilized medical and scientific
data and its categorical bar approach, continuing to hold that as a class of
offenders, youths cannot be sentenced as adults are sentenced. As such,
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence leading up to Miller had largely
relied on a categorical bar approach in juvenile sentencing cases. When the
Court used the proportionality analysis in Roper, the holding resulted in a
de facto categorical bar against the death penalty for all juveniles. 75
Miller v. Alabama
Commentators noted that Miller v. Alabama76 had been set up by the
Roper and Graham holdings that children are constitutionally different
when punishment is at issue, and that the United States Supreme Court was
poised to find juvenile LWOP unconstitutional.77 Although Miller did hold
that the practice as to juveniles constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
all but the most extreme cases, it used the proportionality analysis that
stopped short of categorically barring juvenile LWOP in homicide cases for
sixteen and seventeen year olds.78 Miller held that juvenile LWOP would be
unconstitutional in almost every case, and to protect against violating the
Eighth Amendment, sentencing judges must consider whether the crime
reflects the transient immaturity of youth or irreparable corruption. 79

74

Id.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
76
Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
77
See Robert Chang, et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 88 (2015)
(categorizing Miller as the third case which demonstrates the Supreme Court has held
recently that children may not be sentenced in lockstep with adults and that their youthful
traits require special consideration and protection).
78
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (“We think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to
this harshest possible penalty will be extremely uncommon.”).
79
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 599 (2016). See Chang et al. for a list
of the non-exhaustive factors announced in Miller:
75
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Functionally, Miller’s holding sowed confusion and was applied
inconsistently among state courts.80 Some applied Miller retroactively,
holding resentencing hearings for juveniles serving LWOP; others enacted a
statutory fix—the so-called Miller-fix statutes; some proclaimed Miller was
not retroactive; and some waited for further guidance on how to treat the
juveniles already sentenced in their states.81 One year after Miller was
decided, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of
Montgomery v. Louisiana to decide whether Miller was intended to
announce a retroactively applied substantive rule that required review and
resentencing of final judgments.82 In Montgomery, a youth challenged the
Louisiana courts’ refusal to resentence him after Miller was decided.83 The
Montgomery Court clarified that Miller announced a retroactive substantive
rule, and while Miller did “not categorically bar a penalty for a class of
offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham,”
it “mandate[ed] only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering
an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a

(1) “the character and record of the individual offender [and] the circumstances of the
offense;” (2) “the background and mental and emotional development of a youthful
defendant;” (3) a youth’s “chronological age and its hallmark features-among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the risks and consequences;” (4) “the
family and home environment that surrounds” the youth, “and from which he cannot
usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional;” (5) the circumstances
surrounding the offense, “including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the
way familial and peer pressure may have affected” the youth; (6) whether the youth
“might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth”; for example, the youth’s relative inability to deal with police and
prosecutors or to assist his own attorney; (7) the youth’s potential for rehabilitation given
that most youth are prone to change and mature for the better. Chang et al., supra note
77, at 90–91 (collecting factors from Miller).
80
See Chang et al., supra note 77 at 95 (discussing that states applied Miller in a variety
of ways and that Washington was one of two states to enact a Miller-fix statute).
81
Id. at 94.
82
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (holding that Miller is a substantive rule because it
“alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes’” and that state
courts are not free to decline to follow the holding, even as it applies to final judgments).
83
Id.
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particular penalty.”84 The Montgomery Court further clarified that
“Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile
offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. . . .
After Miller, it will be the rare juvenile offender who can receive that same
sentence.”85
Washington’s Response to Miller
Washington had already interpreted Miller as retroactive and became one
of the only two states whose legislature enacted a Miller-fix statute when
Ramos and Bassett were decided.86 Washington’s Miller-fix statute required
that all youths serving LWOP sentences for homicide committed at ages
sixteen and seventeen have an individualized hearing to determine whether
their original crime reflected permanent incorrigibility or transient
immaturity.87 As such, the Miller-fix statute required Bassett’s resentencing
to account for youth-based mitigating factors including, but not limited to,
Bassett’s age at the time of the crime, his childhood and life experiences,
how much responsibility Bassett could exercise, and his capacity for
rehabilitation.88 The judge at Bassett’s resentencing hearing, which was
required after enactment of the Miller-fix statute, again imposed LWOP on
Bassett.89 Accordingly, Bassett challenged the decision a variety of ways;
the court of appeals only addressed Bassett’s argument that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face because it violated Washington’s ban on cruel
punishment.90 It was on this facial challenge that the court of appeals
84
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ultimately sided with Bassett after conducting a categorical bar analysis. 91
As such, the Washington Supreme Court had its first chance to decide
whether juvenile LWOP was unconstitutional post-Miller with the Gunwall
briefing that it lacked in Ramos.

III. WHY DID BASSETT’S MAJORITY CHOOSE THE CATEGORICAL BAR
TEST?
Fain did not Fit, and Other Possible Explanations
The majority’s choice to adopt the court of appeals’ categorical bar
analysis may be explained in three ways: (1) that because the challenge was
facial, the categorical bar test better fit the challenge that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the category of juveniles; (2) that the parties’
Gunwall briefing allowed the court to consider more protective state
constitutional grounds that could provide categorically bar juvenile LWOP;
and (3) that because the categorical bar analysis required the court to
exercise its independent judicial judgment on juvenile LWOP in
Washington, it empowered the majority to reach its desired policy outcome.
First, the court defended its choice to adopt the categorical bar analysis as
a better fit for the facts of the Bassett’s case and his specific challenge.92
The court analogized to its choice to adopt the categorical bar test to their
decision in 1980 to adopt what became the Fain proportionality analysis
from a nonbinding court.93 The Bassett court stated the test that the
Washington Supreme Court adopted in Fain was necessary because it fit the
challenge “that Fain’s sentence was cruel punishment because it was
grossly disproportionate to his crimes.”94 The court stated that Fain is a test

prohibiting cruel punishment. In the unpublished portion, we reject Bassett’s remaining
arguments.”).
91
Id.
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Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 352.
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Id. at 351.
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Id.
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traditionally used for considering whether a sentence is disproportionate;
Fain did not argue that the statute was unconstitutional to an entire category
of defendants, only that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his
crime.95 Similarly, in Bassett, the majority asserted that the categorical bar
test “fits the challenge Bassett brings—that life without parole is a
categorically unconstitutional sentence for juveniles—and the statute we are
assessing.”96 The Bassett court pointed out that Graham had rejected a
proportional analysis, which would consider “the severity of the penalty and
the gravity of the crime” because the sentenced was challenged as applied to
an “entire class of offenders.”97 As such, the Bassett court held that because
the framework fails to consider youthful characteristics that apply to the
entire category, the test should not be used.98
Accordingly, the majority held that using the Fain proportionality
analysis did not fit the challenge that a punishment is unconstitutional for an
entire category of offenders—in this case, juveniles—and that the
Washington Supreme Court was “free to evolve” its constitutional analysis
without disturbing its prior jurisprudence under the same provision.99 In
Ramos, the court had discussed that Iowa’s Supreme Court—also a
nonbinding decision much like the Fourth Circuit test the court adopted for
Fain—had taken a categorical bar approach in holding all juvenile LWOP
sentences were unconstitutional100 and announced that it may consider a
similar approach in the future.101 Arguably, the Ramos decision invited an
95
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Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (2010).
98
Bassett, 428 P.3d at 351.
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article I, section 14 categorical bar challenge to the Miller-fix statute—and
juvenile LWOP sentences as a whole.
Second, until Bassett, the court did not have the occasion to analyze
juvenile LWOP under the Washington constitution after Miller because the
Ramos parties failed to brief the Gunwall factors for article I, section 14
specific to juveniles. Because Bassett’s challenge gave the court the
opportunity to evaluate statute’s application to the entire category of
juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP, it allowed for the use of the
categorical bar test and for consideration of whether it violated Washington
constitution’s cruel punishment prohibition. The court declared that
evaluating the Gunwall factors was “the prudent starting point for this
case,” further demonstrating its desire to make its holding on Washington
constitutional grounds.102 The court had hinted that an independent state
analysis might have found a different result in Ramos but lamented the
failure of the parties to brief the factors—perhaps further evincing a desire
to find juvenile LWOP violative of article I, section 14. 103 During its
Gunwall analysis, the Bassett court, poised to discuss the issue under state
law, held that the text, history, and Washington’s recent jurisprudence with
respect to juveniles, all pointed to increased protections under article I,
section 14.104 This holding left the Bassett court free to depart from Miller,
which stopped short of a categorical bar.
Third, the court may have chosen to use a categorical bar analysis
because it required “independent judicial evaluation” of the practice at
issue—in this case, juvenile LWOP sentences and broad judicial discretion
at resentencing hearings—clearing a path for the court to ban the practice
altogether. The categorical bar test requires consideration of (1) whether
other states had begun to invalidate a sentencing practice and (2) the court’s

102

Bassett II, 428 P.3d at 348.
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independent interpretation.105 In considering the first prong of the
categorical bar test, the Bassett majority acknowledged that juvenile
sentencing state laws are rapidly recognizing lesser culpability and
increased capacity for rehabilitation, resulting in less harsh punishments for
youths.106 The Bassett court quoted Atkins, a United States Supreme Court
decision that using a categorical bar approach, held that sentencing people
with intellectual disabilities to death was cruel and unusual punishment. “It
is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the trend of the change.”107 The Bassett court found that
since Miller, the number of states categorically barring juvenile LWOP rose
from four to twenty, plus the District of Colombia.108 Thus, the court held
that the first prong of the categorical bar approach was satisfied and that
“while this step is not dispositive, it weighs in favor of finding that
sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole is cruel punishment
under article I, section 14.”109
The second prong of the categorical bar approach allowed the majority to
exercise its independent judgment about whether juvenile LWOP should be
categorically barred in Washington. The Bassett court quoted from Graham
to explain the second prong requires the court to consider “the culpability of
the offenders at issue in light of their characteristics” with the severity of
the punishment and whether the sentencing practice at issue “serves
legitimate penological goals.”110 Bassett’s analysis under the second prong
is largely adopted from the United States Supreme Court. While the dissent
bemoans the majority’s adoption of federal reasoning, the Washington
Supreme Court had used such an approach in O’Dell and Ramos when it
based its holding on the reasoning in Miller, Roper, and Graham to hold
105
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that youths are less culpable due to their lower ability to weigh
consequences, their heightened sensitivity to peer pressure, and their
impulsive behavior, among other things.111 The Bassett majority held that
the punishment at issue is especially harsh for young people who will serve
more years than adult offenders because they are younger when they enter
prison; a life sentence for a fifty year old and a life sentence for a seventeen
year old are not analogous.112 Additionally, the court held that as youths
mature and understand their crimes, they will face a life without hope—and
what some have called a de facto death sentence.113 Further, the retribution
and deterrent penological goals are less effective with youths because they
have lower culpability, and that retribution depends on culpability. 114 In
other words, the goal of deterrence is harder to meet with juveniles; youths
have a lessened ability to consider consequences, so deterrence by threat of
future punishment is less effective.115
In Gregory,116 all nine justices signed the opinion announcing that the
death penalty violates Washington’s ban on cruel punishment; when Bassett
was decided on its heels, the split was somewhat puzzling.117 The dissent’s
disagreement rests mainly with the majority’s extension of Miller, which
did not categorically bar juvenile LWOP and with the departure from “state
precedent rejecting similar constitutional challenges and upholding judicial
sentencing discretion.”118 The dissent argued that the Miller-fix statute
complied with Miller because it required that the resentencing judge
considers the factors contained within Miller—thus complying with the
Eighth Amendment—and that the majority does not support its holding that
111
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article I, section 14 is violated.119 Further, the dissent was frustrated with
the majority’s failure to use Fain, suggesting that the Fain test could have
been harmonized with the Miller factors given that Miller did not create a
categorical bar.120
The argument between the majority and the dissent hinges largely on
their respective confidence in judges to enter sentences that are in
compliance with both Miller and Washington’s ban on cruel punishment.
The majority argues that the judicial discretion allowed under Washington’s
Miller-fix statute is precisely the risk that Washington’s constitution cannot
tolerate—that sentencers will not adequately consider and apply the
mitigating factors reflecting youth’s lessened culpability and a high
likelihood of changing for the better as they mature into adults. 121 The
majority recognized that judicial discretion is ever-present in sentencing,
but the risk for cruel punishment is too great when “even expert
psychologists have [difficulty] determining whether a person is irreparably
corrupt” and what hangs in the balance is whether youths will “live out the
rest of their lives in prison or [have] a chance to return to society.” 122
People on both sides of the issue may see the explanation for the court’s
departure as simply that the Washington Supreme Court decided that
juvenile LWOP is unconstitutional because they wanted to. Criticisms of
the court’s foray into issues that could or should have been decided by the
legislature are not new—some decry the court’s so-called “judicial
activism.”123 While it is outside the scope of this Article, perhaps the court’s
choice to reject its precedential Fain test is best explained by a majority
119
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who wanted to find juvenile LWOP unconstitutional and chose a test that all
but guaranteed that result.

IV. CONCLUSION
As the adage goes, “bad facts make bad law.” In Bassett’s case, it may be
that “good facts made good law.” The judge who sentenced Bassett acted in
his discretion pursuant to the Miller-fix statute, but it cannot be guaranteed
that he meaningfully considered the youth-based mitigating factors. The
Bassett court held that his “resentencing hearing provides an illustration of
the imprecise and subjective judgments a sentencing court could make”
when determining whether a youth is irreparably corrupt and deserving of
juvenile LWOP.124 The mitigation evidence offered by the defense
including the insecurity of homelessness at a young age, Bassett’s inability
to control his emotions, serious family conflict, and the diagnosis as a teen
with an adjustment disorder went unchallenged by the State. Yet, the judge
determined Bassett was likely “more mature” as a result of being homeless
and unwelcome to move home with his family.125
If Bassett’s case was an exemplar of the peril in allowing a judge to
determine whether a youth is irreparably corrupt, then perhaps the Millerfix statute could never ensure that juveniles would be treated differently.
The allowance of discretion about a youth’s sentence—a youth who at the
time was likely immature and who will almost certainly change for the
better—could easily result in the erroneous sentence to die in prison. The
risk of this result, according to Bassett, is intolerable under Washington’s
cruel punishment provision and as such, juvenile LWOP sentences had to
be categorically barred.
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